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Introduction
Since 1985, over 700 savings and
loan institutions have failed in the Unit-
ed States. An additional 300 to 800
S&Ls are expected to fail in the years
ahead. Recently, the General Accounting
Office revised its estimate of the cost of
the S&L disaster to $335 billion.' This is
more than $1,000 for each man, woman,
and child in the country.
The California legislature, California
savings and loan industry, and state reg-
ulators bear a major responsibility for
this massive calamity. To attract more
state-chartered S&Ls, they dismantled
state laws which regulated the conduct
of these institutions and opened the way
for widespread fraud and mismanage-
ment. This article describes how the
State of California recklessly gambled
on deregulation, how that policy failed,
and why the actions of state officials are
now costing federal taxpayers billions of
dollars.
The Dual System
Since the 1930s, the savings and loan
industry has been subject to a dual sys-
tem of regulation. Under this system,
S&Ls may be chartered as either a state
or federal institution. In California,
state-chartered S&Ls are authorized by
the Savings Association Law2 and are
regulated by the California Department
of Savings and Loan (DSL). Virtually
the entire budget for the Department is
collected through an annual assessment
levied on state-chartered institutions.
Until 1989, federally-chartered S&Ls
were regulated by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). Federally-
chartered institutions were also members
of the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC), which guar-
anteed consumer deposits. State-char-
tered S&Ls could also join the FSLIC.
Under California law, all state-chartered
S&Ls were required to be insured by the
FSLIC before they could accept
deposits.'
*The author is the Northern Califor-
nia Supervising Attorney of the Center
Jor Public Interest Law.
Proponents of the dual system main-
tained that it allowed for experimenta-
tion and innovation in the S&L industry.
However, the dual system also enabled
the industry to weaken government
supervision by encouraging competition
among regulators. The S&L crisis took
root in California precisely because of
such competition. Concerned about the
large-scale conversion of state S&Ls to
federal charters in the early 1980s, state
officials sought to entice them back by
repealing statutory restrictions and
weakening the state's ability to supervise
these institutions.
The Race to the Bottom
Both state and federal S&Ls came
under extreme pressure in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Deregulation of interest
rates paid on consumer deposits caused
the cost of funds to increase sharply for
S&Ls. Instead of paying the historic
passbook rates of 3-5%, they were pay-
ing 10-12% to stay competitive with
money market mutual funds.' At the
same time. S&L portfolios consisted of
thirty-year mortgages, fixed at rates of 6-
10%. The result was that the S&Ls were
awash in red ink.'
S&Ls sought several ways out of this
dilemma. First, they attempted to reduce
the amount of fixed-rate mortgages in
their portfolios by enforcing "due on
sale" clauses. Enforcement of these
clauses in loan agreements prevented
buyers from assuming the low, fixed-rate
mortgages from sellers. Second, S&Ls
requested authority to offer adjustable
rate mortgages (ARMs) to reduce the
risk of higher interest rates. Unlike
fixed-rate mortgages, the rates for
ARMs would rise and fall with the level
of interest rates paid by financial institu-
tions. Third, S&Ls sought authority to
diversify their investments. Instead of
investing exclusively in home mort-
gages, S&Ls wanted permission to
invest in a wide range of ventures, some
of which would pay high returns.
S&Ls met with little success at the
state level. In 1978, the California
Supreme Court held in Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America7 that due on sale claus-
es were "unconscionable," and therefore
could not be enforced. In 1980, Gover-
nor Brown vetoed SB 1937 (Foran),
which would have given state-chartered
institutions the power to offer adjustable
rate mortgages. Through 1982, the
Financial Code set strict limits on the
types and amount of investments state-
chartered S&Ls could make.
The S&L industry found the federal
government to be more receptive. In
1982, the U. S. Supreme Court held that
federally-chartered institutions were
exempt from the Wellenkamp decision
In 1981, the FHLBB authorized all fed-
erally-chartered S&Ls to offer adjustable
rate mortgages.' The Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982
expanded the powers available to federal
thrifts."' Under the Act, federal S&Ls
were allowed to make commercial loans
and restrictions on real estate invest-
ments were eliminated.
The advantages of a federal charter
were immediately obvious to most S&Ls
in California. Many converted from state
to federal charters, with devastating
results on the DSL. During the 198 1-82
fiscal year, 50 of the 93 institutions regu-
lated by the Department either converted
to or merged with federal institutions,
resulting in the loss of 68% of the assess-
ment funds used to run the Department."
The flight of state-chartered institu-
tions was so serious that the Depart-
ment's survival as an independent agen-
cy was threatened. In 1982, the
Legislative Analyst recommended that
the Department of Savings and Loan be
merged with Department of Banking.
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While DSL was able to fend off such a
merger, its staffing continued to
decrease. According to former Savings
and Loan Commissioner William Craw-
ford, "In 1983 the Department hit bot-
tom with 42 employees on duty [down
from 175 employees in 1977] and most
of its reporting and monitoring system
dismantled."'"
AB 3539. In 1982, AB 3539 (Nolan)
was introduced to stop the conversion of
state institutions and woo them back
from federal charters by eliminating
many of the restrictions on the types and
amounts of investments for state-char-
tered S&Ls. Most significantly, AB 3539
allowed S&Ls to invest as much as
100% of their assets in service corpora-
tion subsidiaries, which, in turn, could
invest in virtually any activity. The bill
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also allowed state-chartered S&Ls to
directly invest in real estate projects.
Its author, Assemblymember Pat
Nolan (R-Glendale), cited three reasons
for the legislation. First, he claimed it
would "eliminate artificial and archaic
limitations on the authorized investment
portfolio of state-chartered S&L associa-
tions and provide them with the authori-
ty to fully utilize their statutory invest-
ment and loan powers." Second, he
contended that "AB 3539 does not take
S&Ls away from their primary obliga-
tion to housing finance. It will guarantee
that S&Ls will be able to stay in the
housing market by providing them with
the tools to stay afloat during these tur-
bulent times." Third, by benefiting only
state-chartered S&Ls, AB 3539 "may
persuade those associations which are
considering converting to federal char-
ters to retain their state-chartered
status."'"
AB 3539 was sponsored by the
California Savings and Loan League
(now called the California League of
Savings Institutions) and supported by
five S&Ls, including Mt. Whitney Sav-
ings & Loan (Exeter), Seaside Savings
& Loan (Mission Viejo), State Savings
& Loan (Stockton), Lincoln Savings &
Loan (Monterey Park), and Sun Savings
& Loan (San Diego).' The League
claimed that the existing statutory ceil-
ings on investments were outmoded and
that S&Ls "needed versatility" in their
investment powers in order to survive.'
A strong supporter of AB 3539 was
the outgoing California Savings and
Loan Commissioner Linda Tsao Yang.
She advised the Governor that the fol-
lowing benefits would result from the
legislation:
-The elimination of restrictions on the
authority of savings and loans to make
the types of loans and investments speci-
fied by this bill would facilitate the use
of business judgment by the manage-
ment of state-licensed savings and loan
associations.
-Savings and loan associations need
to have the flexibility to structure invest-
ment portfolios which in the judgment of
their investment advisors will bring the
highest rate of return within the confines
of prudent investment practices. The
removal of arbitrary percentage of assets
limitations may allow savings and loan
associations to obtain a greater return on
their investments, thereby making more
funds available for mortgage lending.
-Elimination of the percentage of
assets limitation on real estate owned by
a savings and loan association may
prompt an increase of residential con-
struction financed and developed by sav-
ings and loan associations, which could
prove to be highly profitable for the
association while creating jobs and
increasing the housing stock in Califor-
nia.
-It would be in the public interest to
maintain the state-chartered system as an
attractive environment for savings and
loans within which to operate, allowing
the state to play a meaningful role in the
supervision of this important industry.'7
There was only token opposition to
the measure. Initially, AB 3539 was
opposed by the California Bankers Asso-
ciation, which objected to the elimina-
tion of the 20% maximum limit on con-
sumer loans and commercial paper
because it would place commercial
banks at a "competitive disadvantage.'
Bank of America, Crocker National
Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank also
opposed the lifting of the investment
restriction on service corporations, fear-
ing that S&Ls could use such corpora-
tions to compete for consumer and com-
mercial lending.'" However, CBA and
the individual banks withdrew their
opposition before the bill reached the
Governor's desk.
With strong support from the S&L
industry, vigorous endorsement by state
regulators, and only mild opposition
from banks, AB 3539 sailed through the
Senate by a vote of 22-1, through the
Assembly 67-1, and was signed by the
Governor.2"
AB 2574. Following the enactment of
AB 3539, the state legislature passed AB
2574 (Sebastiani). The bill "cleaned up"
AB 3539 and eliminated the requirement
that the Department of Savings and Loan
conduct biennial solvency examinations
of state-chartered savings and loan asso-
ciations.
AB 2574 was sponsored by the Cali-
fornia Savings and Loan League and
supported by DSL and the Department
of Finance. The only cautionary word
came from the Assembly Office of
Research, which stated: "According to
the Senate Banking and Commerce
Committee, the Senate amendments sig-
nificantly alter the restrictions on the
investments savings and loan associa-
tions can make. These, combined with
the relaxed examination requirement,
might encourage savings and loan asso-
ciations to make investments that could,
in times of economic hardship, threaten
the solvency of the associations."-'
The bill passed 37-0 in the Senate and
69-0 in the Assembly, and was signed by
the Governor.-
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AB 1434 (Bane). In 1983, the Califor-
nia legislature recodified the entire Sav-
ings Association Law, incorporating
additional incentives for state-chartered
institutions. Among other things, AB
1434:
-repealed the requirement that at least
two-thirds of the board of directors of a
state-chartered association be California
residents;
-allowed an association, with the con-
sent of the Savings and Loan Commis-
sioner, to conduct business outside of
California;
-eliminated restrictions on the types
of loans state-chartered S&Ls could
make on nonresidential real estate;
-allowed state-chartered S&Ls to bor-
row funds from any source without limi-
tation and use any of their own assets to
guarantee their debts; and
-allowed state S&Ls to organize as
savings banks.23
According to the analysis prepared by
the Assembly Finance and Insurance
Committee, the purpose of AB 1434 was
to "allow savings associations to effec-
tively compete with federal associa-
tions" and "permit management greater
use of business judgment.' 4 The analy-
sis described AB 1434 as providing
"savings associations with an exceeding-
ly flexible framework within which to
operate and should certainly accomplish
the objectives of the industry and regula-
tors." Despite opposition from banks
(which opposed the savings bank provi-
sion), AB 1434 passed 38-0 in the Sen-
ate, 77-0 in the Assembly, and was
signed by the Governor.-"7
Throughout this period, the focus of
state and federal policymakers was on
giving S&L managers greater leeway in
running their institutions. Policymakers
spoke of "flexibility," "deregulation,"
"business judgment," "entrepreneur-
ship," and "higher earnings." No one
spoke of "risk," "losses," "abuse," or
"fraud," or what these might do to the
public at large.
Nor was there much discussion about
the need for more auditors, appraisers,
and examiners to supervise S&Ls' use of
these expanded powers. In 1983, the
Department of Savings and Loan
employed a total of 42 people, far less
than was needed to oversee the rapid
expansion in the California S&L indus-
try.
State Applications Soar. The induce-
ments worked. In 1983 and 1984, DSL
received a total of 210 new applications
for state-chartered institutions in Califor-
nia.2 The new S&L Commissioner,
Lawrence Taggart, welcomed these
applications. In testimony before the
House Government Operations Commit-
tee in 1989, Taggart stated that he felt
that it was his "job...to encourage the
Nolan Bill [AB 3539]. I even went out
and encouraged people to commit to new
institutions.....27
Many of newly chartered institutions
used their expanded powers to invest in
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high-risk projects. A review of the lend-
ing activities of 29 failed California
S&Ls by William Black, General Coun-
sel of the Federal Home Loan Bank of
San Francisco, shows that from 1982 to
1986 the percentage of home loans made
by these institutions declined steadily,
and the percentage of direct investment
and acquisition, development, and land
(ADL) loans increased dramatically.
0
Mr. Black's review also shows that
by 1985, many of these riskier loans
were in deep trouble. From 1982 to
1984, slow loans"0 and real estate owned
by the 29 S&Ls were stable at less than
5% of their assets. Beginning in 1985,
these rates shot up as borrowers default-
ed on their payments and property was
foreclosed. By 1986, slow loans and real
estate owned represented nearly 25% of
the assets of these institutions.0
Despite overall increases in staff, the
Department of Savings and Loan did not
have the resources to effectively regulate
the large number of S&Ls wielding
extensive new powers. In 1989, James
Cirona, President of the Federal Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco, testified
that even with increased staffing, the
ratio of professional staff per billion dol-
lars in assets held by state-chartered
S&Ls fell during this period.'
"lam Pitching for You." By 1983,
federal regulators were growing con-
cerned about the expanded powers
granted to California S&Ls. To curb the
growth of these institutions, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board imposed a
moratorium on federal insurance for
California thrifts and began the process
of adopting rules which set limits on
investment authority and raised capital
and net worth requirements for new
S&Ls seeking federal deposit insur-
ance.32 In late 1983, the FHLBB and
FDIC proposed new rules to limit feder-
al insurance for brokered deposits."
In both instances, Commissioner Tag-
gart rallied to the defense of his state-
chartered thrifts. He criticized the Board
for trying to preempt liberal California
laws and said that the Board was
"attacking the wrong thing" with its rule
on brokered deposits.34 At a gathering of
nearly 100 angry organizers of new
S&Ls in Los Angeles, Commissioner
Taggart said, "I am pitching for you." 5
The California League of Savings
Institutions (formerly the California
Savings and Loan League) was equally
opposed to efforts to curb the expanded
powers. In 1983, Ray Martin, the
League's newly elected chair, identified
two major priorities for the year: helping
thrifts to develop the new powers given
them in the Garn-St. Germain Act of
1982, and fighting any new attempts to
cut back by reregulation on the expan-
sive powers afforded by the state. "We
have to be alert and concerned about any
attempts in the future to reregulate the
industry," Mr. Martin warned.6
The Crash
Even as Commissioner Taggart and
the League were defending the Califor-
nia S&Ls, many were in trouble. From
January 1, 1983 (the effective date of
AB 3539) to September 1, 1990, S&L
regulators took control of 77 insolvent
S&Ls in California, all but seven of
which were state-chartered institutions."
Among the thrifts that failed during this
period were the five S&Ls that actively
supported the Nolan Bill.
Mt. Whitney Savings and Loan. Mt.
Whitney Savings and Loan (Exeter) was
placed into FSLIC conservatorship in
1986 and finally liquidated in 1988.
According to the Los Angeles Times,
"Mt. Whitney's financial difficulties
began in 1982, when its previous man-
agement began soliciting high-cost jum-
bo certificates of deposit that were
invested in lower paying government
securities and questionable loans."" Mt.
Whitney's problems were also attributed
to "losses on poorly underwritten and
speculative construction loans.""
In 1987, the Federal Home Loan
Bank of San Francisco reported to
Congress that Mt. Whitney's insolvency
would result in a loss to the FSLIC of
$35 million." It also reported that the
FSLIC had filed complaints against fif-
teen insiders, seeking recovery of $17
million."
Seaside Savings and Sun Savings &
Loan. Seaside Savings merged into Sun
Savings & Loan in late 1982. In 1986,
Sun was closed by the FSLIC and liqui-
dated. In testimony before a subcommit-
tee of the House Government Operations
Committee, David Lundin, outside fee
counsel to the Bank Board and FSLIC,
described the problems at Sun as fol-
lows:
First, Sun was a new, publicly
traded savings and loan associa-
tion in the newly-deregulated
marketplace of the 1980s. Much
of Sun's management can best be
described as aggressively incom-
petent. They did, however,
respond to market pressures to
stimulate rapid and profitable
growth-at least in the short run.
Growth in the thrift industry
results from an ability to generate
deposits and make profitable
loans. Traditionally in the thrift
industry deposits were nurtured
over a period of time from a geo-
graphically local deposit base and
were prudently lent within that
same geographic market place, a
market place known to the lender.
By contrast, Sun generated the
majority of its deposits as bro-
kered funds in short-term jumbo
C.D.s, paying broker's fees for
the initial deposits and premium
rates for the privilege of holding
these volatile, short-term funds.
Sun then had to place these
funds at work. As a new and
small association, it neither had a
significant share of the local lend-
ing market, not did it have the
resources to single-handedly
underwrite a large volume of
local loans to profitably occupy
its brokered deposit base.
Sun's need to make loans creat-
ed a demand for two products:
participation interests primarily
underwritten and serviced by oth-
er lenders and loans privately
brokered to Sun.
While there is nothing inherent-
ly wrong with loan participations,
a participating lender is often
dependent upon the lead and ser-
vicing lender for detailed under-
writing, experience with the bor-
rower, local appraisers and
knowledge of the local geograph-
ic market. If this dependence is
misplaced for any reason, the
results are obvious.
Many of Sun's participations
were good, performing loans.
Many were not. Many of Sun's
participations were with other
ultimately troubled and now-
closed associations, including
Eureka Savings and Loan, State
Savings and Loan Association of
Utah, and Hawaii and First Sav-
ings and Loan Association of
Orland Park, Illinois.
Eureka, now closed by regula-
tors, was operated by the Kidwell
brothers. Its failure has been
attributed in part to losses arising
from loans to Las Vegas casinos
and to William Oldenberg.
State Savings and Loan was
owned and controlled by Mr.
Oldenberg. That failure has been
attributed in part by [sic] self-
dealing by Mr. Oldenberg,
including the sale of parcel of
Bay Area property which he had
personally acquired for $800,000
which was then sold to State for
$55 million.
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First of Orland Park was closed
by regulators in late 1986. Sever-
al among its controlling group
have been indicted by a Federal
Grand Jury in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois.
Sun also relied upon loan bro-
kers to provide borrowers of the
brokered deposits....[Some] bro-
kers extract large up-front fees
for loans promised and never
made. Some facilitate their
clients' frauds by not disclosing
adverse credit information or
even prior criminal convictions
for bank fraud. Others are more
overt and may simply bribe bank
officers as needed to obtain loans
and related brokerage f es.
A highly disproportionate share
of the loans brokered to Sun were
non-performing loans and result-
ed in losses to the Association
and ultimately to the FSLIC.
Among these loans were ones to
Morris Shenker and the Dunes
Hotel and Casino, where Sun's
President and CEO claims to
have won much of his $200,000
which was deposited to the secret
account.
These participations and bro-
kered loans were a major con-
tributing cause to Sun's failure. It
is currently estimated that this
failure alone will cost the FSLIC
approximately $114 million dol-
lars.42
In 1989, Sun's President Daniel Dier-
dorff was convicted of two felony counts
of misuse of the institution's funds and
sentenced to eight years in prison."
State Savings and Loan (American
Savings and Loan). In 1983, State Sav-
ings and Loan (Stockton) merged with
First Charter Financial Corporation to
form American Savings and Loan, the
largest S&L in the country."4 Under the
direction of Charles Knapp, American
Savings became one of most aggressive
institutions in the use of its expanded
powers. The Los Angeles Times report-
ed: "Fueled by high-rate deposits from
Wall Street 'money brokers,' Knapp
financed real estate ventures and securi-
ties purchases. In 1984, he was ousted by
regulators after the Securities and
Exchange Commission forced FCA
[American's parent] to restate its earn-
ings to show a huge loss, which trig-
gered a $7-billion run on deposits."
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Knapp's successor, William Popejoy,
was unable to turn American Savings
around and, in 1988, it was sold to
Robert Bass. The deal included $1.7 bil-
lion in federal subsidies to entice the
Texas billionaire to take over the insol-
vent institution.
Lincoln Savings and Loan. Lincoln
Savings & Loan (Monterey Park) was
acquired in 1984 by American Continen-
tal Corporation. Lincoln was placed in
FSLIC receivership in August 1989.
Under the direction of Charles Keating,
Jr., Lincoln Savings invested heavily in
junk bonds and risky real estate projects.
The collapse of Lincoln Savings-the
details of which are currently unfolding
through civil litigation, criminal prose-
cutions, and state and federal regulatory
enforcement actions-is expected to be
one of the largest S&L failures in U.S.
history, costing taxpayers as much as $2
billion. 6
On September 19, 1990, Mr. Keating
was indicted on 42 counts of state securi-
ties fraud arising from the sale of $200
million in uninsured bonds to Lincoln
customers.7 The bonds were rendered
virtually worthless when American Con-
tinental declared bankruptcy and Lincoln
Savings was seized by federal regula-
tors.
The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to
Own a Bank. The new powers granted
to S&Ls and lack of effective supervi-
sion by state regulators opened the way
for fraud and abuse by S&L managers.
In 1987, the new Savings and Loan
Commissioner, William J. Crawford,
reported to the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary
Affairs that over the previous two and
one-half years, he had been forced to
close thirty state-chartered, federally
insured S&Ls; and that in almost every
closure, insider misconduct played a sig-
nificant or even a determining role." In
testimony before the subcommittee,
Commissioner Crawford stated:
The controls, historically, were
set out to protect the cash and
securities in a financial institu-
tion. They always wanted to pro-
tect against the officers stealing
the cash, and the tellers stealing
the cash; somebody converting
securities, bearer securities to
their personal use. We build thick
vaults; we have cameras; we have
time clocks on the vaults; we
have dual control-all these con-
trols to protect against somebody
stealing the cash.
Well, you can steal far more
money, and take it out the back
door. The best way to rob a bank
is to own one. If you have 100
percent control, you can make
yourself the chairman of the audit
committee, the chairman of all
committees ....The system of
internal control doesn't work.
We've gone upscale where we
have got temptation, opportunity,
and greed; we are handling much
larger sums of money.
49
In 1989, the U.S. General Accounting
Office reported that in investigating 26
failed thrifts (eight of which were in Cal-
ifornia), all had changed from traditional
to high-risk activity." GAO also found
evidence of insider abuse and fraud at
each and every one of these failed insti-
tutions.' The GAO found that insider
abuse flourished because of:
-Inadequate supervision by directors
of the thrift and dominance by one or
more individuals.
-Breach of fiduciary duty to the thrift
by officers and directors. GAO found
that 77% of the S&Ls examined violated
conflict of interest regulations or
engaged in related unsafe practices.
-Inadequate underwriting or adminis-
tration of loans.
-Noncompliance with loan terms.
-Excessive compensation and expen-
ditures.
-Extensive and imprudent participa-
tion in acquisition, development, and
construction transactions, often with
related parties. GAO cited one Califor-
nia thrift that lent $40 million to one bor-
rower principally to build condominiums
and a shopping center. No feasibility
studies were done. Examiners stated that
studies would have shown that the area
was already heavily overbuilt before the
loans were ever made. The thrift was
expected to lose over $10 million on the
project.
-Loans to borrowers exceeding legal
limits. Examiners found that 88% of the
failed thrifts violated a federal regulation
limiting the amount of money thrifts can
lend to a single borrower.
-Sloppy and intentionally deceptive
recordkeeping.
GAO found that because of the dual
regulatory system, federal officials were
uncertain about heir authority to curb
the use of expanded powers granted to
state-chartered S&Ls. The GAO report
states:
Bank Board officials also told
us that before 1985 they viewed
their authority to issue regula-
tions to restrain state-chartered
thrifts from engaging in high-risk
activities as "questionable." The
officials said that Bank Board
officials at that time were hesitant
to act in certain instances, espe-
cially where state law gave thrifts
specific powers which federal
laws did not address.
Twenty of the 26 failed institu-
tions reviewed were state-char-
tered. While the Bank Board lim-
ited federally chartered thrifts
from making certain "direct
investments" (such as equity
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securities, real estate, service cor-
porations, and operating sub-
sidiaries, etc.), state-chartered
thrifts often were authorized to
make such direct investments
under state law. Moreover,
FSLIC did not have regulations
which placed limitations on the
type and amount of direct invest-
ments insured thrifts could
make.52
As federal officials questioned their
legal authority over state-chartered
S&Ls, the unsupervised use of the
expanded powers led to even more loss-
es for the FSLIC. In February 1989, the
Office of Management and Budget esti-
mated that the cost of resolving the S&L
crisis would cost the federal government
$158 billion; in September 1990, that
figure was revised to an astounding
$335 billion."
FIRREA
By 1989, members of Congress were
aware that the dual regulatory system for
thrifts had contributed to the massive
losses to the FSLIC. To stem these loss-
es, Congress passed the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 (FIRREA)" The Act
represents a complete rejection of the
dual system of thrift regulation. Recent-
ly, Senator Don Riegle, Jr., Chair of the
Senate Banking Committee, described
one of FIRREA's chief objectives as fol-
lows:
[The Act] also placed important
new restrictions on State powers.
Prior to FIRREA's enactment,
State law alone provided the only
limitations on the powers of
State-chartered thrifts.... In sever-
al states, those limitations were
not very substantial. The States
of Texas and California, in partic-
ular, removed virtually all restric-
tions on the investment activities
of State-chartered thrifts within
their States, all of them neverthe-
less connected to the Federal
deposit insurance system. This
permitted California and Texas
thrifts to raise deposits and invest
them in virtually anything, know-
ing that the Federal deposit insur-
ance system would pick up any
loss that might result. Many
thrifts exploited this opportunity
to the hilt, raising brokered
deposits and investing them in
such things as racetracks, wind-
mill farms, junk bonds, raw land,
and other things of that sort. The
consequences of such abuses for
the Federal deposit insurance sys-
tem were catastrophic....In 1977,
54 percent of all of the losses in
the national system went to pay
for losses incurred by State-char-
tered thrifts in just two states, the
States of California and Texas
alone. And that figure grew in
1988. Fully 70 percent of all of
the payouts from the insurance
fund went to cover losses by
State-chartered thrifts in those
same two States, Texas and Cali-
fornia.
FIRREA put a stop to those
abuses. The statute generally
restricted State thrifts to activities
permissible for Federal thrifts,
creating exceptions only for State
thrifts that fully satisfy all appli-
cable capital standards and in turn
can meet a second test, namely to
convince the FDIC that the activ-
ity in question poses no signifi-
cant risk of loss to the deposit
insurance fund."
FIRREA significantly expands the
role of federal regulators in overseeing
the S&L industry. The FHLBB, which
was responsible for chartering federal
S&Ls and overseeing the FSLIC, was
abolished. FIRREA created a new agen-
cy, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), to be the primary regulator of
both federally-chartered and state-char-
tered S&Ls." To replace the FSLIC, the
Act established a Savings Association
Insurance Fund (SAIF), administered by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC). 7 The FDIC is granted sub-
stantial new powers over both state and
federal institutions to protect the safety
of the SAIF"
The Act sets stiffer capital require-
ments for S&Ls." An S&L that fails to
meet these requirements must submit a
business plan to OTS addressing (1) the
need for increased capital, (2) how such
capital is to be acquired, and (3) the
types of activities in which the S&L
plans to engage. The plan must be
approved by OTS. After January 1,
1991, OTS is required to restrict the
asset growth of any S&L that fails to
meet the capital standards.'
To address the abuses prevalent in the
S&L industry, FIRREA also:
-requires that the loan-to-one-bor-
rower restrictions for national banks
apply to all S&Ls;'
-prohibits S&Ls from investing in
junk bonds and requires that S&Ls
remove them from portfolios by July I,
1994; 2
-prohibits S&Ls from directly invest-
ing in real estate and other ventures, and
restricts investment in service corpora-
tions:6'
-restricts nonresidential real estate
loans to 400% of a S&L's capital;'
-restricts transactions between affili-
ated entities and prohibits below-market
rate loans to S&L insiders;65
-prohibits the use of brokered
deposits by S&Ls failing to meet the
new capital requirements;'
-protects S&L employees who report
violations to federal regulators;67 and
-establishes new civil and criminal
penalties for fraud and abuse."
In addition, FIRREA establishes a
stringent new test to ensure that S&Ls
maintain a strong commitment to resi-
dential lending.' Institutions that fail to
meet this test may be required to convert
to commercial banks. Beginning July 1,
1991, at least 70% of a S&L's portfolio
must consist of loans for the purchase,
refinancing, construction, improvement,
or repair of domestic residential housing
and related investments. Effective imme-
diately, S&Ls that fail this Qualified
Thrift Lender (QTL) test may obtain
advances from Federal Home Loan
Banks only for the purpose of funding
residential housing. Beginning in August
1990, S&Ls which are not QTLs will be
be forced to limit their activities to those
permissible to national banks and will no
longer be eligible for any new advances
from the Federal Home Loan Banks.
Two years later, S&Ls which are not
QTLs will be required to divest them-
selves of all investments, cease engaging
in activities not permitted to national
banks, and repay all outstanding
advances owed to the Federal Home
Loan Bank system."'
It is far too early to know whether
these reforms will ultimately result in a
healthy S&L industry. As of June 1990,
the S&L industry was showing neither
dramatic improvement nor precipitous
decline. As a whole, the industry is still
in poor condition. Of the 2,949 S&Ls
operating in the United States at the end
of 1988, over 400 were in government
control. Of the S&Ls not in government
control, about 20% are undercapitalized
or insolvent, 33% are squeaking by, and
less than half are healthy.7'
Conclusion
The last time the savings and loan
industry was in such serious distress was
in the 1930s. In 1934, Congress enacted
the National Housing Act to restore pub-
lic confidence by creating the FSLIC to
insure consumer deposits.72 For deposit
insurance to work, S&L regulators must
be extremely vigilant to prevent, detect,
and immediately halt those practices
which pose a threat to an institution's
solvency. Without such vigilance, S&L
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managers will gamble with consumer
deposits. Heads-they win; tails-the
federal taxpayer loses.
In the 1980s, deposit insurance
encouraged the California legislature
and state regulators to gamble with con-
sumer deposits. Fearing the loss of state-
chartered institutions to the federal gov-
ernment, state officials bet that
deregulation would win those institu-
tions back to state "control". That gam-
ble worked for awhile, but the staggering
losses which ensued forced the federal
government to assume control over both
state and federally-chartered institutions.
The California legislature's servile
compliance with the deregulation ambi-
tions of the industry was not merely the
consequence of Republican deregulation
ideology. As noted above, the votes were
nearly unanimous. The savings and loan
industry gave prodigious sums in cam-
paign contributions to California legisla-
tors while these measures were consid-
ered, and afterwards. Common Cause
reports that, over the ten-year period of
1979-1989 during which the deregula-
tion steps proceeded, the industry con-
tributed $4,117,239 to elected state offi-
cials. This California total is over
one-half the total amount in reported
contributions to the entire United States
Congress over the same period. Over
one-quarter of the state total came from
savings and loans subsequently rendered
insolvent, including American Savings
and Loan ($327,342), Columbia Savings
and Loan ($240,460), Mercury Savings
and Loan ($189,838), and Lincoln Sav-
ings and Loan ($165,251).
During this ten-year period, Assem-
blymember Tom Bane, who authored
AB 1434, received $513,000 from the
S&L industry-more than twice the sum
received by California Senator Pete Wil-
son, the largest recipient of any member
of Congress. Between 1981 and 1989,
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown
received $215,740 and Senate President
pro Tempore David Roberti received
$214,417 from the industry. In 1986-87,
Governor George Deukmejian, who
appointed Lawrence Taggart as Director
of the Department of Savings and Loan
in 1983 and signed all three deregulation
bills, received $130,000 from Charles
Keating, his family, Lincoln Savings and
Loan, and associated entities.
The total industry contributions to
California officials stood at $735,434 in
1979-80 when federal deregulation
began. They shrunk to $480,979 in
1981-82 as savings and loan institutions
left state charter for federal deregulation,
and California elected officials became
less important. Then the amounts
increased to $651,563 as the three bills
described above were enacted, and con-
tinued up to $1,194,660 in the 1985-86
period just before the crash.'
FIRREA marks the end of Califor-
nia's reckless policy of deregulation.
Instead of expanding its control over the
S&L industry, state officials ended up
losing all meaningful control to the fed-
eral government.4 Instead of strengthen-
ing the S&L industry, the California leg-
islature assisted in its destruction.
Instead of serving the California public,
state officials betrayed their public trust
and added billions of dollars to the bur-
den paid by federal taxpayers.
FOOTNOTES
1. Seidman Totals Costs of S&L
Bailout; Election Year Congress Talks of
New Taxes, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1990, at
A-2.
2. Financial Code § 5000 et seq.
3. Financial Code §§ 8030-38.
4. Financial Code § 5606.
5. U.S. League of Savings Institu-
tions, Savings Institutions Sourcebook
(1989) at 24.
6. In 1981, on a nationwide basis, the
S&L industry suffered a $4.6 billion
after-tax loss, for a negative 15.39%
return on equity. Id. at 52, 55.
7.21 Cal. 3d 943 (1978).
8. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141
(1982).
9. FHLBB, Adjustable Mortgage
Loan Instruments, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148
(Apr. 30, 1981).
10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-64, repealed
by the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat.
277-343 (1989).
11. Testimony of William J. Craw-
ford, California Savings and Loan Com-
missioner, in Fraud and Abuse by Insid-
ers, Borrowers, and Appraisers in the
California Thrift Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21
(June 13, 1987) (hereafter referred to as
"1987 Fraud Hearings").
12. Office of the Legislative Analyst,
Analysis of 1982-83 Budget, at 343,
345-46.
13. Statement of William J. Craw-
ford, California Savings and Loan Com-
missioner, in Savings and Loan Crisis:
Field Hearings before the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., Ist Sess., 426 (Jan. 12-13,
1989) (hereafter referred to as the "1989
Crisis Hearings").
14. Statement of Assemblymember
Nolan regarding AB 3539, Assembly
Finance, Insurance, and Commerce
Committee (May 4, 1982).
15. See Analysis of AB 3539 pre-
pared by the Assembly Finance, Insur-
ance, and Commerce Committee (Apr.
28, 1982) at 3.
16. Statement of Assemblymember
Nolan regarding AB 3539 before the
Assembly Finance, Insurance, and Com-
merce Committee (May 4, 1982).
17. Department of Savings and Loan,
Enrolled Bill Report regarding AB 3539
(June 16, 1982) at 2. The State Banking
Department also supported the measure,
stating that the "current investment
restrictions are not necessary" and "the
health of the banking industry should not
be impacted." State Banking Depart-
ment, Enrolled Bill Report regarding AB
3539 (June 16, 1982) at 2.
18. Letter from George R. Cook, Vice
President, State Government Relations,
California Bankers Association, to The
Honorable Patrick J. Nolan, re Assembly
Bill 3539 (Apr. 30, 1982) at 1. The CBA
letter also stated that the elimination of
the 10% assets limitation on investment
in real property "bothers us," but did not
request an amendment of that provision.
Id. at 3. Later, the CBA dropped its
opposition entirely when the bill reached
the Governor's desk. Enrolled Bill
Memorandum on AB 3539 (June 21,
1982) at 1.
19. Id.
20. Chapter 300, Statutes of 1982.
21. Assembly Office of Research,
Concurrence in Senate Amendments to
AB 2574 (Aug. 19, 1982) at 2.
22. Chapter 845, Statutes of 1982.
23. Assembly Office of Research,
Concurrence in Senate Amendments to
AB 1434 (Sept. 9, 1983) at 2-3.
24. Analysis of AB 1434 prepared by
the Assembly Finance and Insurance
Committee (Apr. 8, 1983) at 2.
25. Chapter 1091, Statutes of 1983.
26. See Testimony of Lawrence Tag-
gart, former California Savings and
Loan Commissioner, in 1989 Crisis
Hearings, supra note 13, at 152. See
also Boom Now Underway in California
in Profitable, State-Chartered S&Ls,
American Banker (Jan. 6, 1983) at 2.
27. Testimony of Lawrence Taggart,
1989 Crisis Hearings, supra note 13, at
159. He wasn't the only booster of the
new laws governing thrifts in California.
The Los Angeles branch of a large law
firm conducted seminars for persons
interested in starting or acquiring a state-
chartered S&L, touting the benefits as
including: the ability to raise "virtually
unlimited amounts of capital," "unparal-
leled leveraging of funds," "flexible and
profitable loan opportunities," and the
prestige of being a member of the
"financial institutions club." James R.
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 1990)
FEATURE ARTICLE
Butler, Chairman, Financial Institutions
Department, Jeffer, Mangels & Butler,
Why Does it Seem Everyone is Buying
or Starting a California S&L? (1984), in
1987 Fraud Hearings, supra note 11, at
206-21.
28. Testimony of William Black,
General Counsel to the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, in 1987 Fraud Hear-
ings, supra note 11, at 163. Loans for
one- to four-unit residential property fell
from over 45% of assets in 1982 to
under 30% in 1986. Meanwhile, direct
investment and ADL loans increased
from about 7% of investments in 1982 to
15% in 1986. Id. at 157-62. Mr. Black's
review also shows that the percentage of
direct investment and ADL loans by the
29 California institutions was far above
that of the national average. For exam-
ple, in 1985, the 29 California S&Ls had
20% of their assets in those categories,
compared to only 5% for S&Ls nation-
wide. Id. at 160.
29. Mr. Black defined "slow loans" as
those which are delinquent for sixty days
or more. Id. at 163.
30. Id. at 154.
3 1. Statement of James Cirona,
President, Federal Home Loan Bank of
San Francisco, 1989 Crisis Hearings,
supra note 13, at 294.
32. FHLBB, Regulation of Direct
Investment by Insured Institutions, 50
Fed. Reg. 6,912 (Feb. 19, 1985), codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. Part 563.96, which
expired on July 13, 1990, pursuant to 12
C.F.R. Part 563.96(h). FHLBB, Net
Worth of Financial Institutions, 49 Fed.
Reg. 47,852 (Dec. 7, 1984); this pro-
posed regulatory change was never for-
mally adopted.
33. FDIC and FHLBB, Brokered
Deposits: Limitations on Deposit Insur-
ance, 48 Fed. Reg. 50,339 (Nov. 1,
1983); adopted 49 Fed. Reg. 13,003
(Apr. 2, 1984); codified at 12 C.F.R.
Parts 330.13(b), 564.12(b). These rules
were later invalidated in FAIC Securi-
ties, Inc. v United States, 595 F.Supp. 73
(D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
34. California S&L Chief Opposes
Federal Efforts to Curb Power of State
Thrifts, BNA Daily Report (Mar. 27,
1984) at A-7.
35. Insurance Delay Irks California
S&Ls; Associations Awaiting Regulato-
ry Nod Meet to Trade Stories, American
Banker (Nov. 10, 1983) at 3.
36. Give New Thrift Powers a
Chance, Says Ray Martin, Head of Calif
League, American Banker (Oct. 4, 1983)
at 3.
37. Office of Thrift Supervision,
Federal Agency Interventions Since
1980 (as of Aug. 31, 1990).
38. Regulators Close 2 State Thrifts,
Transfer Deposits, Los Angeles Times
(Feb. 27, 1988), Business Section at 4.
39. Banking Regulators Seized Mt.
Whitney Savings, Los Angeles Times
(Feb. 13, 1986), Business Section at 2.
40. See Letter from William Black,
General Counsel, Federal Home Loan
Bank of San Francisco, to Honorable
Douglas Barnard Jr. (Nov. 2, 1987),
Exhibit A, in 1987 Fraud Hearings,
supra note 11, at 476.
41. Id., Exhibit C, at 480.
42. Prepared Statement of David E.
Lundin, Attorney, Finley, Kumble, &
Wagner, San Diego, California, in 1987
Fraud Hearings, supra note 11, at 382-
83.
43. S&L Official Pleads Against
Lenient Dierdoiff Sentence, Los Angeles
Times (San Diego County Edition) (Jan.
7, 1989), Metro Section, Part II, at I. See
also Wanted: "Bank Cops" Packing
Accountants' Tools, American Banker
(Feb. 27, 1989) at 2.
44. American Savings Ends Home
Savings' 28-Year Reign as Nation's Top
S&L: First in Deposits and Assets,
American Banker (Feb. 28, 1984) at 1.
45. The Renaissance of American
Savings & Loan; Its 1989 Profit is the
Envy of the Industry, But It Took the
Resources of Robert M. Bass, the Lead-
ership of Mario J. Antoci and $1.7 Bil-
lion from Taxpayers to Get There, Los
Angeles Times (Feb. 5, 1990), Business
Section at 1.
46. Lincoln S&L Posts a $163.9 Mil-
lion Loss, Los Angeles Times (Sept. 28,
1990), Business Section at 2.
47. Keating Indicted for Fraud,
Jailed: Three Associates at Lincoln Also
Are Charged. A Grand Jury Says They
Victimized Investors in the Sale of $200
Million in Bonds, Los Angeles Times
(Sept. 19, 1990) at 1.
48. Briefing Memorandum, Califor-
nia Thrift Industry/Insider Misconduct
Hearing, in 1987 Fraud Hearings, supra
note 11, at 450.
49. Id. at 9 (emphasis original).
50. See General Accounting Office,
Wrongdoing, Fraud Main Factor in
Thrift Industry Crisis: Report to
Congress (Mar. 22, 1989), reprinted in
Investigation of Lincoln Savings & Loan
Association: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 521 (Oct.
26, 1989).
51. ld. at 485.
52.1d at 505.
53. See supra note 1.
54. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183
(1989).
55. 136 Cong. Rec. 73 (June 11,
1990).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1462 etseq.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1817.
58. 12 U.S.C. § 1821.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(6).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1831e.
63. Id.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1468.
66. i2 U.S.C. § 1831f.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1878.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(l).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(3).
71. 136 Cong. Rec. 73 (June I1,
1990) (statement of Sen. Riegle, Table
A).
72. 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). FSLIC was
established in section 402 of the Nation-
al Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1725), and
was abolished by FIRREA, Pub. L. No.
101-73, Title VII, § 703(a), Aug. 9,
1989, 103 Stat. 415.
73. For a more complete itemization
of official contribution filings by the
savings and loan industry, see Clearance
Sale of the Decade: The Role of Califor-
nia Elected Officials in the S&L Scan-
dal, California Common Cause and Pub-
lic Citizen (October 1990).
74. The California Department of
Savings and Loan is again an agency on
the decline. With a large number of
state-chartered institutions either out of
business or under government control,
its assessment base has again dropped
dramatically. The Department's total
staff is decreasing. The Legislative Ana-
lyst recently recommended that (1) the
legislature terminate the chartering pro-
visions under the Savings Association
Law, (2) existing state-chartered S&Ls
be required to convert to federal charters
over time, and (3) in the interim, DSL be
merged with the State Banking Depart-
ment to form a new Department of
Financial Institutions. Legislative Ana-
lyst, Analysis of the 1990-91 Budget Bill,
at 249.
Thp C-lifornW- R,-an tory I -w Rpnort-. Vol 10 No 4 (F-11 1990)
